Memorandum to General Partners: Pearsall position statement by Pearsall, Duane & Pearsall, Duane
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Digital WPI
MS055-04-0003 Columbine Venture Fund (CVF
II)
MS055.04 Recognition, Awards, and
Correspondence
6-15-1993
Memorandum to General Partners: Pearsall
position statement
Duane Pearsall
Duane Pearsall
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wpi.edu/ms055-04-0003
This Other is brought to you for free and open access by the MS055.04 Recognition, Awards, and Correspondence at Digital WPI. It has been accepted
for inclusion in MS055-04-0003 Columbine Venture Fund (CVF II) by an authorized administrator of Digital WPI. For more information, please
contact digitalwpi@wpi.edu.
Recommended Citation
Pearsall, Duane , Pearsall, Duane (1993). Memorandum to General Partners: Pearsall position statement. .
Retrieved from: https://digitalcommons.wpi.edu/ms055-04-0003/2
MEMORANDUM 
TO: General Partners 
FROM: Duane Pearsall 
DATE: December 11, 1991 
SUBJECT: Position statement for Duane D. Pearsall 
Position relative to my role as a General Partner of both CVF I and 
CVF I I. 
Commensurate with this major change in the structure and operating 
character of Columbine, I believe it is an appropriate time for the 
remaining partners to recommit themselves to the support of each other 
partner and to the highest ethical principles in our relationships 
throughout this industry. 
The first step in this recommitment is to agree that under no 
circumstances will we make any degrading or disparaging remarks 
concerning Mark Kimmel. We will also live by the spirit and the intent 
of the Agreement of Separation. I, personally, will not tolerate 
anything but the highest level of ethics in the administration and 
implementation of all elements of the Withdrawal Agreement with Mark 
Kimmel. 
I will plan to retire at the end of Fund I or approximately October 31, 
1993. I look forward to these remaining 22 months for two fundamental 
reasons. First, our level of communications between partners will be 
enhanced dramatically. Second, there is a level of good chemistry and 
mutual respect that most certainly will result in a higher level of 
productivity and success. 
Although, as I have declared, I will not be part of Fund III. However, I 
will do everything possible to help in the formation of that fund should 
that be the consensus of your judgment. 
Commitment and Compensation 
I agree to increase my commitment of time to Fund I and Fund II to no 
less than 50% for a compensation from CVM II of $72,500 per year. In 
addition, I will accept an annual allocation of $16,000 to cover expenses 
under the same expense/bonus plan as used by the other partners. This 
anticipates travel commitments of approximately one-fourth that of the 
other partners. 
Participation in the Distribution of Excess Funds From CVM I 
The attached chart is a summary of bonuses paid from CVM, Inc. and CVM I 
from 1988 through September 30, 1991. The following is a listing of some 
of the "rationale" for judging how the CVM I surplus &Imel~ be 
distributed: ~?/!:'Hr 
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1. In proportion to the original CVM, Inc. ownership, which is probably 
legally correct. 
2. By the partners' contribution to the Fund I performance. 
3. Simply equal distribution to each of the Fund I partners. 
4. Adjusted by individual fund raising performance for Fund I. 
5. Percent of time committed to Fund I in the past. 
6. Percent of time committed to Fund I going forward. 
7. Number of deals supervised in Fund I. 
8. One's handicap at Castle Pines. 
9. Ratio of winners versus losers under his control. 
a. By number of deals. 
b. By dollars. 
It is clear that none of the above items by themselves are a basis for 
making a distribution judgment. However, assuming that salaries in 
Fund II are proportionate to the time commitment for each partner, basing 
the distribution of Fund I excess upon a time commitment essentially for 
Fund II, is not only inequitable, but flagrantly so . A coverup to this 
distribution became obvious when I never had the opportunity to co-sign 
one of those checks. 
As I said earlier, I am looking forward to the new partnership because I 
believe we have eliminated the source of the element of "mistrust". I am 
not interested in diluting Sherman or Terry from their four-thirteenth's 
interest in the Fund I excess. I accept the offer of a lump sum 
compensation for the past inequity in the form of CVM !I's reimbursement 
to Fund I as a participation in the severance payments to Mark. I -!E!X~lf~ll!'Jl~ 
that~ compensateJfor the inequity up through 12/31/91. 
Although it is hard to judge the value of one point of a General 
Partner's carried.JpJ:~rest, I wi~assume that the Fund will breakeven 
and one percent Arepresent~~$ ,000. Therefore, I propose that I be 
allocated one-half percent r l!f"""' t e one and one-half percent residual 
available following Mark's departure. That increase ~/~carried 
interest, together with the continuing one-thirteenth distribution of 
Fund I excess provides a means of not dilu t ing the current distribution 
16~ Sherman and Terry, or interfere with the Withdrawal Agreement with 
Mark. 
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In the spirit of openness and equality among the partners, I believe 
there currently exists an inequity relative to Carl's participation in 
Fund I benefits. I estimate Carl spends as much as 20% of his current 
effort on Fund I business with no ultimate reward. I, therefore, 
recommend that the remaining one percent F"~the residual of one and 
one -half percent of Mark's carried interest be allocated to Carl, 
bringing his carried interest from 3 points to 4 points. 
Twice in the history of these Funds I have given away carried interest 
voluntarily. First, you will remember the residual carried interest from 
the buyout of David Miller. My portion of that distribution was given to 
Terry and Mark equally in recognition of their fund raising efforts for 
Fund I. ~My recollection of the allocation initially for Fund II prior to 
raising funds was 5 points each to three partners, 3 points to me and 2 
points unallocated. When it became obvious that we would need more 
unallocated points to entice a new GP, I voluntarily gave up 1 point. 
Later, when negotiations with Carl got serious, and we felt we needed })/11.C 
unallocated point for future contingencies and it would take 3 points to 
entice Carl, I gave up another point. As I remember, my rationale in 
this judgment was simply that Fund II would be a ten year program and at 
my age the carried interest would not be important. In addition, I 
elected not to be an active participant in the fund raising effort, 
whereas Carl was doing an outstanding job and without him there would be 
no Fund II. No/' to recognize that performance and his continuing 
contribution to Fund I, in my opinion, reestablishes aNs-et::J:u;Qc inequity. 
I apologize for the length of this memo, but with the above adjustments, 
I believe we have a great opportunity to have both a productive and an 
enjoyable experience. 
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